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INTRODUCTION: STATE REDUCTION OF MUNICIPAL ASSETS 
States faced with fiscally distressed municipalities typically must 
confront creditor demands for payment, the satisfaction of which 
would threaten the provision of local public services.  A state that 
attempts to strike the delicate balance between assisting its local 
governments and maintaining relationships with creditors has 
substantial options.  The state can, of course, simply provide funding 
to municipalities, perhaps conditioned on municipal reforms that 
address the problem of moral hazard.1  Alternatively, states may assert 
 
* Max E. Greenberg Professor of Contract Law, NYU School of Law. Thanks to 
participants in the 2020 Fordham Urban Law Journal Cooper-Walsh Colloquium and 
especially to David Schleicher for insightful comments.   
 1. For example, during New York City’s fiscal crisis in the 1970s, New York State 
not only provided funding to the city, but also established an emergency financial 
control board that imposed a three-year wage freeze on city employees, rejected a 
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authority over the municipality either in concert with or in substitution 
of municipal officials2 and attempt to negotiate solutions with creditors 
or grant creditors priority in municipal revenues.3  The state may also 
authorize and encourage the municipality to adjust its debts, primarily 
by entering Chapter 9 of the federal Bankruptcy Code.  Each of these 
efforts may bring some relief to municipal budgets.  But they have very 
different effects on creditors, and thus on the potential incentives that 
future creditors may have to invest in municipalities of the state.  
Providing direct relief to the distressed municipalities or dictating 
priorities in revenues may permit payment of creditors in full.  States 
may exercise that option in order to signal future creditors that debts 
will be paid.  The importance of such signals to maintain the 
creditworthiness of municipalities is embodied in provisions such as the 
New York State Constitution’s requirement that cities pledge their 
faith and credit to debts and exceed real estate tax limits if necessary 
to pay those debts.4  Another example is a provision in the General 
Laws of Rhode Island that requires cities grant creditors “first liens” 
on tax revenues and thus requires payment of debts prior to other 
municipal expenses.5 
Other jurisdictions have been less solicitous of creditors and have 
embraced some form of the third alternative.  States that permit their 
municipalities to enter bankruptcy essentially signal the possibility that 
creditor claims will be adjusted in those proceedings.6  Current law 
prohibits states from enacting their own version of unilaterally 
 
contract that had been negotiated with the transport workers’ union, required the 
imposition of tuition at the previously free City University of New York, and modified 
the city’s financial plan. See ROBERT W. BAILEY, THE CRISIS REGIME: THE MAC, THE 
EFCB, AND THE IMPACT OF THE NEW YORK CITY FINANCIAL CRISIS 64–66, 75–77 
(1984); see also SEYMOUR P. LACHMAN & ROBERT POLNER, THE MAN WHO SAVED 
NEW YORK 129–37 (2010). 
 2. See Clayton P. Gillette, Dictatorships for Democracy: Takeovers of Financially 
Failed Cities, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1373 (2014). 
 3. For example, when the City of Central Falls, Rhode Island, faced financial 
hardship, the state enacted a statute that gave bond creditors priority over other 
creditors, such as pensioners of the city. See 45 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-12-1 (West 
2014). 
 4. See N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; Flushing Nat’l Bank v. Mun. Assistance Corp., 
358 N.E.2d 848, 850 (N.Y. 1976). 
 5. See, e.g., 45 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-12-1(a). 
 6. The Bankruptcy Code requires that states specifically authorize their 
municipalities to enter federal debt adjustment proceedings. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2). 
Only half the states have done so. See Kristen M. DeJong & Beth A. Dougherty, 
Municipal Bankruptcy: A Primer on Chapter 9, NUVEEN (Oct. 20, 2020), 
https://www.nuveen.com/en-us/thinking/municipal-bond-investing/municipal-
bankruptcy-a-primer-on-chapter-9 [https://perma.cc/VN56-7FYU]. 
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compromising debts of their municipalities. 7   But states may also 
attempt to shift the costs of municipal fiscal distress from residents to 
creditors by altering the nature of the underlying debt obligation rather 
than directly reducing the amount of indebtedness.  That may take the 
form of shifting assets initially used to support debt to a new set of 
creditors.  Those efforts were prominent in the late nineteenth century, 
as states altered debtor municipalities’ boundaries and taxing authority 
on which existing creditors had relied.  More recently, states have 
attempted to assist distressed municipalities through more subtle 
means of shifting assets. 8   Both New York State and Illinois, for 
example, have diverted to new state entities tax revenues previously 
available to creditors of distressed cities in an effort to generate capital 
to which those cities would not otherwise have access, and thus allow 
the continuation of municipal services that face reduction or 
elimination. 9   The nineteenth-century versions of asset shifting 
typically failed on the ramparts of the U.S. Constitution’s Contracts 
Clause or similar creditor protections.10  One might readily dismiss 
those nineteenth-century analogues as sufficiently antiquated or born 
of different circumstances to reject their applicability to the more 
contemporary state interventions on behalf of distressed 
municipalities.  The effects of the nineteenth-century strategies on 
creditors, however, bear enough similarity to recent instances of 
redirecting assets that it is useful to determine the implications of those 
earlier legal challenges for contemporary forms of municipal finance.  
In this Article, I address those similarities and explain why, even if the 
early cases remain persuasive authority for the limits of state 
intervention, they do not inevitably invalidate the current 
interventions. 
States that attempt to reduce municipal debt burdens by shifting 
assets are not necessarily acting inappropriately, notwithstanding 
adverse effects on existing creditors.  Bond creditors may be better 
positioned than residents to monitor municipal fiscal performance.11  
Where that is the case, allocating fiscal risks to those creditors rather 
than to residents or other creditors might induce bondholders or their 
 
 7. See 11 U.S.C. § 903(1) (“[A] State law prescribing a method of composition of 
indebtedness of such municipality may not bind any creditor that does not consent to 
such composition . . . .”). 
 8. See infra Part III. 
 9. See infra Part III. 
 10. See infra Part II. 
 11. See Clayton P. Gillette, Bondholders and Financially Stressed Municipalities, 
39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 639, 655 (2012). 
756 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVIII 
representatives to act in a manner consistent with their monitoring 
advantage.  A state that shifts risks to creditors may therefore be 
allocating that risk efficiently.  Alternatively, a state might reasonably 
conclude that it is more important to maintain municipal services than 
to ensure full payment to creditors, and thus seek to reallocate risks ex 
post, regardless of which group was better able to monitor budgets ex 
ante.  The very existence of a municipal bankruptcy regime implies that 
there are circumstances in which concerns for municipal fiscal health 
prevail over concerns that obligations to creditors will suffer 
diminution. 
Nevertheless, states that offload risks to creditors may also be acting 
strategically, favoring the imposition of current costs on creditors and 
long-term costs on future officials and residents who bear the risk that 
credit markets will demand higher interest rates from defaulting 
localities.  State officials who consider themselves accountable to 
current residents may have political incentives to engage in that form 
of risk-shifting.  Those incentives may be enhanced where creditors 
comprise non-residents or represent distant capital markets.12  Where 
states interfere with creditors’ payments, either by authorizing 
municipal bankruptcy or by altering the underlying obligations, 
evaluation of the propriety and substance of that intervention may 
depend on whether one believes that the state was motivated by the 
benign story of efficient allocation of risk and maintenance of 
municipal services or the malign story of exploiting creditors. 
In this Article, I suggest that the underlying purpose for which the 
state diverts assets from cities should determine the legality of the 
strategy, notwithstanding the similar effects on creditors that result 
from using the strategy for different purposes.  The legal implications 
may differ if the state diverts assets primarily to exploit non-resident 
creditors who have little voice in the decision than if the state adopts 
the same strategy to ensure continued delivery of a distressed 
municipality’s services.  I claim that the nineteenth-century cases 
reveal a willingness to sacrifice creditor security even where 
unnecessary to maintain the debtor municipality’s fiscal status and that 
courts intervened to mitigate such strategic behavior when they 
observed it.  More contemporary diversions, however, appear to have 
been undertaken to ensure that the debtor municipality survives 
liquidity crises and can provide the services for which the municipality 
 
 12. See CHARLES FAIRMAN, 6 RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864–1888, at 958–
60 (1971); ERIC H. MONKKONEN, THE LOCAL STATE: PUBLIC MONEY AND AMERICAN 
CITIES 9 (1995). 
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was created.  In effect, the courts appear to demand that the state 
balance the need for creditor security against municipal fiscal stability 
and tend to permit diversions that facilitate municipal access to need 
capital.  But the cases neither speak in those terms nor involve much 
analysis of how shifting assets will reduce creditor recovery, perhaps 
because — in the nineteenth-century cases, at least — the reduction of 
creditor security was near total.  Thus, the cases appear to reveal 
judicial concern for what I refer to as the state’s motive, that is, judicial 
suspicion that the state is acting strategically rather than engaging in 
the kind of balancing that might justify some increase in creditor risk. 
Part I provides a brief discussion of overriding principles that govern 
the capacity of states to alter the debts of their political subdivisions.  
Part II then discusses several of the major Supreme Court nineteenth-
century decisions that addressed efforts by states to reduce creditor 
access to pledged assets of defaulting municipalities.  Those efforts 
entailed dramatic changes to municipal legal status and geography, 
such as shifting municipal boundaries and claiming that reformed 
municipalities did not incur the obligations of their predecessors.  Most 
importantly, Part II discusses not only what states did on behalf of their 
distressed localities, but why. 
Part III discusses more contemporary versions of asset shifting.  It 
also explores the difficulties inherent in determining the effects that 
even benign efforts to divert revenues have on current creditors.  In 
particular, Part III discusses the significance of stable market values for 
existing securities during and after the period when the state has 
created a diversion strategy.  Some courts have relied on market values 
to conclude that current creditors are unharmed by the diversion of 
assets from the debtor.  This Part, however, contends that 
consideration of market values at the time of litigation over the 
propriety of allegedly impairing legislation cannot predict potential 
adverse effects of the diversion strategy in the distant future. 
I. STATE RESPONSES TO MUNICIPAL DEBT BURDEN 
In the absence of legal constraints, a state could readily shift the risk 
of fiscal distress simply by compromising municipal debts, leaving 
debtors with unencumbered access to assets previously pledged to the 
payment of debt service.  In effect, a state could impose its own 
municipal bankruptcy regime and adjust its municipalities’ obligations 
accordingly.  Doing so, however, initially sounds like an obvious 
violation of the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution.  That 
provision prohibits states from enacting any “[l]aw impairing the 
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Obligation of Contracts,”13 and a law that permits a debtor to pay less 
than is owed seems like the quintessential example of an offending 
impairment.  Of course, since the Depression-era case of Home 
Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell,14 courts and commentators have 
understood the Contracts Clause as eschewing an absolute prohibition 
on state intervention in public or private contracts.15  States may enact 
impairing legislation necessary “to protect the . . . general welfare of 
the people,” and legislatures have “wide discretion . . . in determining 
what is and what is not necessary.” 16   The Clause imposes fewer 
constraints on state interference with contractual rights where the 
alleged impairment addresses a widespread social problem that would 
permit full payment to creditors only at the cost of “safeguard[ing] the 
vital interests of its people.” 17   Moreover, nominally impairing 
legislation may create no constitutional difficulty where it is 
accompanied by compensation or replaces one form of security for the 
adversely affected one. 18   Even admitted impairments may pass 
constitutional muster where the offending “[l]egislation adjust[s] the 
rights and responsibilities of contracting parties . . . upon reasonable 
conditions and [possesses] a character appropriate to the public 
purpose justifying its adoption.”19   The state’s capacity to alter its 
contractual obligations is weaker, however, where its commitment 
does not implicate reserved police powers but is “purely financial.”20 
In theory, states may have even more latitude than the constitutional 
constraint suggests.  Justice Felix Frankfurter’s intellectual gymnastics 
in Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park,21 a case I revisit 
later in this Article, 22  considered the practical implications of an 
alleged impairment and thereby created an opportunity for states to 
restructure debt where the effect was to increase the expected value of 
otherwise uncollectable debts.23  Statutory changes in the Bankruptcy 
Code effectively overruled that case by prohibiting states, and it turns 
 
 13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 14. 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
 15. See, e.g., JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE: A CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY 239–40 (2016).  
 16. City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 508–09 (1965) (quoting E. N.Y. Sav. 
Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 232–33 (1945)). 
 17. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 434. 
 18. See United States Tr. Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 (1977). 
 19. Id. at 22. 
 20. See id. at 25. 
 21. 316 U.S. 502 (1942). 
 22. See infra notes 155–63 and accompanying text. 
 23. See Faitoute, 316 U.S. 502. 
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out, Puerto Rico, from imposing a composition of indebtedness.24  But 
if the state-imposed solution approved in Faitoute increases the value 
of creditors’ holdings, then perhaps the proper argument — suggested 
initially by Michael McConnell and Randal Picker25 — is to repeal the 
statutory proscription.26   Moreover, there is a significant argument, 
accepted by federal courts in the Southern District of New York27 and 
the District of Puerto Rico,28 that distinguishes between a permissible 
extension of the time for payment and a prohibited composition of 
indebtedness. 
Historically, however, states have been more creative in reducing 
creditors’ access to municipal assets than simply extending the maturity 
of the debt in question.  In the nineteenth century, state intervention 
took blatant forms of dissolving indebted municipalities or merging 
them into other municipalities that claimed no obligation to pay the 
merged jurisdiction’s creditors. 29   As the next Part recounts, those 
strategies rarely succeeded, defeated by a series of Supreme Court 
cases that were instrumental in defining the scope of the Contracts 
Clause during the pre-Blaisdell era.  But their antiquity does not entail 
their irrelevance.  In a period in which states have discovered more 
nuanced mechanisms for stripping a discrete set of revenues previously 
available to creditors, attention to those earlier cases reveals whether 
the situations are easily distinguishable or whether the same impulses 
that motivated the obvious diminution of contractual security infect the 
more nuanced ones. 
 
 24. See 11 U.S.C. § 903. For application of the prohibition, see Puerto Rico v. 
Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1938 (2016). 
 25. See Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A 
Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 479–80 
(1993). 
 26. Given the presence of Chapter 9, a repeal of the statutory proscription would 
make sense only if state bankruptcy regimes generated benefits not attainable through 
the federal bankruptcy process and imposed no offsetting costs. One potential benefit 
would be that states could address structural and governance defects that contribute to 
municipal fiscal distress in ways not easily achieved through federal law. See generally 
Clayton P. Gillette & David A. Skeel, Jr., Governance Reform and the Judicial Role 
in Municipal Bankruptcy, 125 YALE L.J. 1150 (2016). 
 27. See Ropico, Inc. v. City of New York, 425 F. Supp. 970, 983 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
 28. See Assured Guar. Corp. v. Garcia-Padilla, 214 F. Supp. 3d 117, 126 (D.P.R. 
2016). 
 29. See infra Part II. 
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II. THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY DISSOLUTION CASES 
A. Railing Against Debt: State Reactions to Municipal Defaults 
The story begins in the mid- to late-nineteenth century when 
municipalities first engaged in debt financing, largely to support 
promoters of railroad lines or similar infrastructure.30  Debts incurred 
for these purposes took the form of what is referred to today as a 
general obligation bond, payable from the general taxes of the issuer 
rather than solely from the revenues generated by the railroads that 
benefitted from the bond proceeds.31  Thus, bondholders anticipated 
payment regardless of the success of the enterprise their bonds 
financed.  Nevertheless, these debts were presumed to be relatively 
burden-free for residents, as the financed facilities would generate 
economic development and the corresponding tax revenues necessary 
to pay bondholders.32 
Commentators such as John Dillon feared the fiscal mischief that 
long-term debt would impose on municipalities induced by the promise 
of painless repayment and a belief that any risk would fall on 
subsequent generations: “[T]he stimulus which the long credit 
commonly provided for effectually supplies, to over-indebtedness.”33  
Indeed, many localities soon discovered that the presumed economic 
benefits would not materialize — not every municipality could become 
a major crossroads in the national market that railroads promised to 
create.34  Defaults on debt followed, motivated either by the failure of 
promoters to construct the promised railroad; the financial failure of a 
constructed railroad; general fiscal distress of the borrowing locality, 
exacerbated by the railroad aid debt; or simple reluctance to pay debts 
 
 30. See ALBERT MILLER HILLHOUSE, MUNICIPAL BONDS: A CENTURY OF 
EXPERIENCE 143–99 (1936); ALBERTA M. SBRAGIA, DEBT WISH 58–60 (1996). 
 31. See L. A. Powe, Jr., Rehearsal for Substantive Due Process: The Municipal 
Bond Cases, 53 TEX. L. REV. 738, 739–40 (1975). 
 32. See SBRAGIA, supra note 30, at 55–57. 
 33. JOHN F. DILLON, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL BONDS 5 (1876). Dillon suggested 
that municipalities seeking railroads and similar internal improvements systematically 
incurred unaffordable debt: 
The writer has known new counties in a western state, not containing over 
10,000 inhabitants, vote, for a single railway, bonds to the amount of $300,000, 
drawing ten per cent interest, payable annually, and instances are not 
infrequent where bonds have been issued greater than the assessed value of 
all the taxable property at the time, within the municipal or territorial sub-
division. 
Id. 
 34. See Powe, Jr., supra note 31, at 739. 
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— sometimes justified by accusations of bribery or fraud. 35   Eric 
Monkkonen concluded that in late nineteenth-century Illinois, 
taxpayers “tried to avoid paying their debts if they thought they could 
get away with it,”36 and that decisions to default were often “political, 
not fiscal,”37 though he more generously argued that some defaulting 
localities were retaliating against railroad firms that failed to live up to 
their contractual obligations.38 
Confronted with localities either unwilling or unable to pay their 
debts, states could either support creditors in their claims against their 
borrowers or assist the recalcitrant localities.  One might have thought 
that states would take the former route to avoid any contagion that 
might otherwise flow from the reluctance of capital markets to extend 
credit to the state or its other political subdivisions.  However, states — 
perhaps motivated by the New York’s domination of capital 
markets39  –– frequently opted to enjoy short-term political benefits 
and intervened to frustrate creditors’ remedies.  As Dillon put it, 
“[o]ccasionally it has been witnessed that the state, in all its 
departments, has actively sympathized with the repudiating 
municipality, and the public faith has been redeemed only through the 
coercion of the Supreme Court of the United States.”40 
But one need not attribute purely strategic motives to states that 
desired to assist their localities at the expense of distant creditors.  
Localities had a reasonable expectation that technological advances 
were a condition of economic development, and that support of those 
technologies — canals, railroads, communication facilities — would 
attract commercial entities and generate tax revenues essential to 
economic success.41  In the nineteenth century, no less than today, local 
governments sponsored technological development by facilitating the 
networks that generate agglomeration benefits.42  They did so by doing 
 
 35. See id. at 740; see also SBRAGIA, supra note 30, at 58–60. For plausibly 
fraudulent practices by railroad promoters to secure the assent of municipalities to the 
issuance of bonds, see for example FAIRMAN, supra note 12, at 958–60; HILLHOUSE, 
supra note 30, at 152; MONKKONEN, supra note 12, at 76. 
 36. MONKKONEN, supra note 12, at 69. 
 37. Id. at 76. 
 38. See id. 
 39. See Allison R. Buccola & Vincent S.J. Buccola, The Municipal Bond Cases 
Revisited, 95 AM. BANKR. L.J. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 11–12). 
 40. DILLON, supra note 33, at 6. 
 41. See SBRAGIA, supra note 30, at 44–47. 
 42. See generally OSCAR HANDLIN & MARY FLUG HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH: A 
STUDY OF THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: 
MASSACHUSETTS, 1774–1861 (rev. ed. 1987). 
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what cities seeking economic growth have historically done: support or 
create the infrastructure necessary to allow the provision of those 
benefits, such as transportation terminals, or provide the amenities 
(police services, roads, sanitation) uniquely specific to urban life.43  A 
city that failed to adopt novel technologies that would allow it to 
connect to other cities within a developing national economy was 
unlikely to grow or even to survive.44  Notwithstanding the reservations 
that Dillon expressed, incurring debt was a rational mechanism to 
attract economic opportunities, since the necessary technologies were 
sufficiently capital intensive that government units could more readily 
provide the necessary infusions than nascent capital markets could.45  
Even in an era characterized by limited municipal authority, states 
granted their localities explicit permission to aid railroads, and 
municipalities, induced by over-optimism or perhaps a fear of being 
left behind in the race for metropolitan growth, unhesitatingly entered 
the competition.46 
Once those capital investments were made, however, they created a 
risk that if the anticipated economic benefits failed to materialize, the 
outstanding debt would cause the debtor municipality to suffer 
economic and population shrinkage rather than expansion.  Failure of 
large numbers of railroads was inevitable given the number of fledgling 
companies that sought to dominate the transportation of goods and 
people.47  The intense competition among rivalrous cities to become 
major hubs of transportation and economic activity, however, also 
meant that railroad failures would cause municipal failures.48  Those 
failures, in turn, required states to confront both political and economic 
pressures to shift the subsequent losses to creditors who had purchased 
the railroad aid bonds now in default.49 
While the political incentives to favor residents over non-resident 
creditors are readily comprehensible, the economic incentives are 
more complicated.  One might believe that states would resist the 
political pressure to shift losses to avoid the risk that capital markets 
would punish a defaulting jurisdiction within the state, and that the 
default of one municipality would tinge the credit of other jurisdictions 
 
 43. See PAUL BAIROCH, CITIES AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 151–52 (1988). 
 44. See SBRAGIA, supra note 30, at 44–50. 
 45. See id. 
 46. See, e.g., DILLON, supra note 33, at 16; HILLHOUSE, supra note 30, at 153; Powe, 
Jr., supra note 31, at 739. 
 47. See FAIRMAN, supra note 12, at 934; HILLHOUSE, supra note 30, at 149–53. 
 48. See SBRAGIA, supra note 30, 58–60. 
 49. See id. 
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within the state.  That economic reality applied regardless of whether 
defaulting municipalities claimed inability to pay or reluctance to pay 
predicated on fraud or failure of consideration.  Bond purchasers had 
extended credit based on the promise to pay, and they expected 
payment. 
But the states’ motives to intervene may also have reflected 
recognition of the relationship between debt relief and municipal 
success.  Municipalities attract tax base and investment by providing 
services that potential and actual residents value no less than the tax 
price they must pay to receive them.50  In short, mobile residents and 
capital will migrate to municipalities that provide services from which 
residents and capital receive net benefits.  That objective cannot be 
satisfied when there is significant debt overhang, that is, when 
substantial revenues of the municipality are dedicated to past services 
or to debt payments from which current payers receive no benefit.51  
Under those conditions, potential investors in a locality are likely to 
forgo investment, and mobile capital already situated within the 
municipality is likely to exit to jurisdictions more capable of providing 
benefits consistent with residents’ financial burdens.  The consequence 
of debt overhang is a downward spiral of the local economy as fewer 
fiscally capable taxpayers must support a continuing stream of debt 
payments leading to a cycle of additional disinvestment and exit.52 
That result was exactly what nineteenth-century municipal debtors 
experienced — loss of population, political will to pay debts, and 
capacity to pay even those debts that the population recognized as 
legitimate.53  State intervention to reduce debt burden by encouraging 
default and rescuing those localities that took that route, therefore, was 
not necessarily a political imperative born of a desire to externalize 
costs.  It was equally an economic decision predicated on a desire to 
maintain economic growth in an era that preceded a federal 
bankruptcy regime that could facilitate the same result. 
 
 50. See, e.g., Omer Kimhi, Reviving Cities: Legal Remedies to Municipal Financial 
Crises, 88 B.U. L. REV. 633, 658–59 (2008). This result is implicit in the Tiebout 
hypothesis, which predicts that under a series of strong assumptions, in-migration and 
out-migration will generate an efficient level of municipal services. See Charles M. 
Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 65 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956). 
 51. See, e.g., Vincent Buccola, The Logic and Limits of Municipal Bankruptcy Law, 
86 U. CHI. L. REV. 817, 845 (2019). 
 52. See Clayton P. Gillette, How Cities Fail: Service Delivery Insolvency and 
Municipal Bankruptcy, MICH. ST. L. REV. 1211, 1213–14 (2019). 
 53. See SBRAGIA, supra note 30, at 61. 
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The form of state intervention varied.  There are well-told stories54 
of courts providing relief to indebted municipalities by invalidating 
bonds allegedly issued without sufficient legal authority or compliance 
with legal prerequisites,55 or concluding that railroad aid constituted an 
impermissible private purpose.56   My concern, however, involves a 
strategy other than questioning the validity of the bonds.  Given the 
nature of the obligation that the defaulted bonds represented — 
general obligation bonds payable from the revenues and property of 
the debtor municipality — creditors’ remedies against defaulting 
municipalities consisted primarily of efforts to seize municipal taxes or 
other municipal property.  Sympathetic states diluted the value of that 
remedy by the rather direct device of altering the identity of the 
indebted municipality.  This process consisted of measures such as 
redrawing the defaulting municipality’s boundaries or, in more radical 
cases, abolishing it altogether, allegedly leaving creditors of the issuer 
without recourse remedy since the nominal debtor municipality no 
longer existed.  I refer to these strategies collectively as involving 
“dissolution” of the indebted municipality. 
Initially, the strategy of dissolution had some success in providing 
relief to distressed municipalities.  In 1879, the Tennessee legislature 
repealed the charter of the City of Memphis.57  The city had been in 
perilous financial condition, partially a consequence of yellow fever 
outbreaks, and partially a function of mismanagement and failure to 
collect 40% of levied taxes, some of which were required to pay bonds 
to support railroad construction and other infrastructure 
improvements. 58   When creditors brought actions for writs of 
mandamus to have outstanding taxes collected and paid to them, the 
state withdrew the city’s taxing authority, assumed control of the city’s 
property, 59  created a taxing district to administer taxes that were 
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imposed directly by the legislature on the geographic area previously 
defined as the city, and provided a procedure by which the Governor 
would appoint a receiver for the municipality to collect outstanding 
taxes and seek to compromise the outstanding debt.60  The legislation 
also exempted taxes due or moneys of the county trustee from legal 
process, prohibited the issuance of any writ of mandamus or other 
processes from compelling the collection of taxes, and proscribed the 
use of taxes imposed by the state to pay debts of the dissolved 
municipalities. 61   In short, the legislature upended the traditional 
remedies used by municipal creditors to obtain and execute judgments 
against defaulting debtors.  But the legislature also required that pre-
dissolution taxes owed to the city be collected by the state-appointed 
receiver and dedicated to the payment of its debts, a tactic that Justice 
Stephen J. Field believed to be a demonstration that the legislature was 
not trying to exempt the city from its “just liabilities.”62 
Not surprisingly, creditors of Memphis initiated an action to collect 
on their debts and invalidate the state legislation.  The federal court in 
that suit appointed its own receiver to take possession of the city’s 
assets.63  Thus, there were two competing receivers, one appointed by 
the Governor and one appointed by the court, each charged with 
overlapping duties of collecting property and dealing with Memphis 
creditors.  That conflict generated the inevitable dispute that ended 
with the Supreme Court’s complicated and ambiguous decision in 
Meriwether v. Garrett.64 
The opinion for the Court consisted of a brief statement of the 
Court’s conclusions, but was devoid of any rationale.  Those 
conclusions simply addressed the issue of which assets were available 
to municipal creditors after the state’s intervention; there was no 
explicit determination concerning the legitimacy of that intervention.65  
The Court defined the assets available to creditors restrictively.  
Creditors, the Court concluded, did not have access to physical 
property held in trust for the public or private property of individuals 
within the city’s limits.66  Nor could creditors reach taxes previously 
levied but not collected, unless the legislature explicitly so 
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 63. See id. at 507–08. 
 64. See id. at 508. 
 65. See id. at 501–02 (opinion of the Court). 
 66. See id. at 501. 
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authorized.67  The state-appointed receiver could, pursuant to statute, 
collect taxes that had been levied prior to dissolution, but those funds 
could only be used for the purposes for which they were raised.68  The 
implication was that the legislation had effectively barred Memphis 
creditors from any recourse against taxes imposed through the state-
created taxing district and not explicitly allocated to the payment of 
Memphis debts.  That the taxing district now encompassed the 
population, geography, and economy of Memphis was legally 
irrelevant. 
In an opinion joined by three other Justices, Justice Field provided 
his reasoning behind the Court’s otherwise unembellished conclusions.  
Perhaps most importantly, Justice Field concluded that municipal 
property that had been available to pay debts prior to dissolution 
would remain available to creditors after dissolution. 69   But taxes 
previously levied, though uncollected at the time of dissolution, did not 
qualify as such property.  Uncollected taxes imposed for the support of 
government — “ordinary taxes” — were not property of the 
municipality that could be seized for debts.70  “They are only the means 
provided for obtaining funds to support its government and pay its 
debts, and disappear as such means with the revocation of the charter, 
except as the legislature may otherwise provide.”71  Hence, the lower 
court could not have ordered its receiver to collect them.  While 
mandamus might lie to compel an officer of the municipality to collect 
outstanding debts, once the office of collection was abolished, “there is 
nothing upon which the courts can act.”72  Only the legislature could 
levy taxes and hence prescribe the means by which they are collected.73  
Courts, certainly federal courts, might have been able to compel the 
collection of currently authorized taxes.  But they had no authority to 
continue taxing powers that had been removed by the legislature or 
create new taxing authority.74  Creditors could seize the anomalously 
designated “private property” of the municipality or proceed by 
mandamus to require the state-appointed receiver to collect such taxes 
as the state permitted.75   Beyond that, unpaid creditors could only 
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supplicate to the legislature, 76  which had, of course, already 
demonstrated a lack of sympathy for their plight. 
Although the majority of the Court did not directly address whether 
dissolution of the debtor municipality without providing for payment 
of its debts unconstitutionally impaired the obligation of contract, 
Justice Field’s concurrence implied that repeal of a tax “so connected 
with a contract, as the inducement for its execution” would constitute 
such a violation.77  But the debts at issue in Meriwether did not involve 
any specific taxes designated for payment to bondholders.  They were 
secured solely by “ordinary taxes authorized for the support of 
government” that constituted “only the means provided for obtaining 
funds to support its government and pay its debts.”78  The power to 
collect those taxes and use the proceeds to pay debts dissolved when 
the municipality did, unless the legislature provided otherwise.79  The 
negative implication of that statement was that the dissolution of 
Memphis did not impair an obligation of contract because no 
commitment of particular taxes had formed part of the contract with 
bondholders.  Certainly, in Justice Field’s view, federal courts had 
limited capacity to interfere with state procedures that restrained the 
collection of debts or to designate as property of the municipality those 
assets that the legislature had excluded. 
Justice Field further concluded that those who enter into contracts 
with municipalities do so with full knowledge that the legislature can 
alter them or their powers.80  That remark, standing as a statement of 
the relationship between states and their political subdivisions, seems 
uncontroversial.  But if Justice Field meant that knowledge of state 
authority over its political subdivisions deprived creditors of all 
remedies if the state withdrew municipal assets subsequent to the time 
credit was extended, his conclusion would deprive the Contracts 
Clause of all meaning.  A valid law in effect at the time that bonds are 
issued certainly becomes incorporated into the bond contract.  Thus, if 
state law validly permitted subsequent modifications of the contract, 
state imposition of such a modification would not create an 
impairment.81  The state’s ability subsequently to modify the contract 
was part of the original bargain.  But to transform that proposition into 
one that embodies a general legislative power unilaterally to impose 
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any post-issuance modification of municipal revenue raising authority 
would eliminate any vestige of the capacity of one legislature to bind 
another.  Perhaps that explains Justice William Strong’s dissenting 
remark that “[i]f ever legislation impaired the obligation of contracts, 
this did.”82 
The Court’s failure to address the issue of impairment directly 
caused at least some to conclude that dissolution combined with 
deprivation of all taxing power to pay outstanding debts was 
constitutionally permissible.  Indeed, John Dillon, probably the major 
authority on municipal finance at the time, interpreted Meriwether 
that way and concluded that if the state dissolved a debtor municipality 
and failed either to provide for the payment of its debts or to create a 
successor with taxing authority payable for debt service, then the courts 
are “practically powerless” to provide creditors with a remedy.83 
Other states avoided the receivership route but attempted to deprive 
creditors of municipal assets by merging the indebted locality into 
other entities that claimed no responsibility for the debts of the pre-
merger municipalities.  That strategy proved less successful in the 
federal courts.  For example, the town of Racine, Wisconsin, fell victim 
to the railroad bond craze and subscribed for $50,000 worth of railroad 
stock in 1853.84  The city paid for the stock with the proceeds of bonds 
issued with a 20-year term.85   With what can only be described as 
perfect foresight or perfect irony, the state legislature in 1860 renamed 
Racine as Orwell.86  The legislature subsequently dissolved the town 
and annexed its property in parts to other existing towns.87   Those 
towns maintained that, since Orwell had disappeared, they had no 
authority to impose taxes necessary to pay its debts.88 
One might have thought that disestablishment of a town was the 
ultimate means of denying creditors access to its taxing authority or 
property, so that reallocation of Orwell’s assets to other towns fell 
within the doctrines established by Meriwether.  But the Supreme 
Court had a different response than it did in the Memphis case.  In 
Town of Mt. Pleasant v. Beckwith, the Court concluded that, 
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if the extinguished municipality owes outstanding debts, it will be 
presumed in every such case that the legislature intended that the 
liabilities as well as the rights of property of the corporation which 
thereby ceases to exist shall accompany the territory and property 
into the jurisdiction to which the territory is annexed.89 
The legislature’s failure to make a provision for the payment of debts 
of the extinguished municipality necessarily impaired the obligation of 
contract.90  That proposition, however, would seem, as a logical matter, 
to apply as readily to the Tennessee law that transformed Memphis 
into a taxing district as it did to the carving up of Orwell. 
Some states simply extinguished municipalities and replaced them 
with new municipalities.  The poster child for this strategy was the 
Alabama legislature.91  In 1859, the legislature authorized the City of 
Mobile to issue bonds to finance the Mobile & Great Northern 
Railroad Company.92  The city defaulted on the bonds in 1878, and 
bondholders sought a writ of mandamus for collection of taxes 
sufficient to pay the debt.93  The Alabama legislature cagily responded 
with a law that abolished the City of Mobile and ordered its property 
to be sold to pay the debts of the dissolved city.94  That response was 
not, however, necessarily an effort to ensure the availability of 
sufficient assets to satisfy bondholders in full, or even to pay its “just 
liabilities” to the extent possible.  Instead, as in the case of the 
Tennessee legislation contested in Meriwether and as was common in 
other efforts to resolve default litigation,95 the ostensible intent of the 
Alabama legislature was to force creditors to compromise the 
municipality’s debts.  The law that required the sale of city property 
provided for the appointment of commissioners to sell the municipal 
property and “to treat with the holders of the funded debt of the city 
of Mobile with a view to its adjustment and settlement.”96  But the law 
also prohibited the commissioners from imposing new taxes to pay the 
delinquency that would inevitably arise, given the limited assets 
available for sale and the priority that other debts had over the railroad 
bonds. 97   The legislature then incorporated a new municipality, 
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designated as Port of Mobile, that comprised about 94% of the taxable 
property and about 93% of the residents of the former City of Mobile.98  
The omitted property consisted “largely of fields, swamps and land 
covered with water.”99  But the incorporating legislation essentially 
prohibited those who governed the Port from levying any taxes to pay 
the former city’s debts. 
The Supreme Court saw right through the ruse.  The Court 
concluded that, as in the case of merged municipalities, the Port of 
Mobile was the legal successor to the City of Mobile and hence liable 
for its debts: 
Where the resource for the payment of the bonds of a municipal 
corporation is the power of taxation existing when the bonds were 
issued, any law which withdraws or limits the taxing power and leaves 
no adequate means for the payment of the bonds is forbidden by the 
Constitution of the United States, and is null and void.100 
While the Court did not invoke the Contracts Clause by name, and 
some have therefore concluded that the Court never explained the 
legal basis for its decision, 101  it seems clear that Court had the 
Contracts Clause in its sights.  The rationale it provided for the decision 
is textbook Contracts Clause jurisprudence: “[T]he remedies for the 
enforcement of such obligations assumed by a municipal corporation, 
which existed when the contract was made, must be left unimpaired by 
the legislature, or, if they are changed, a substantial equivalent must be 
provided.”102  What may have been implicit, though unspoken, in the 
Court’s decision was a rejection of the drastic nature of the state’s 
action.  There was little doubt that the city suffered distress sufficient 
to warrant “adjustment and settlement” of Mobile’s debt. 103   But 
perhaps the Court was suspicious that the best way to force an 
equitable compromise was to disestablish the city and purport to revive 
it without any consideration to creditors’ claims for repayment. 
Other courts were similarly less attentive to the niceties of existing 
Contracts Clause doctrine to constrain states that had transparently 
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denied creditors access to property that initially served as security for 
their debts.  After the failure of Jay Cooke & Company, the largest 
employer in the City of Duluth, the city’s population declined from 
5,000 to 1,500 within a year, and tax delinquencies increased 
significantly. 104   With the city deeply in debt and little means of 
satisfying bondholders, the legislature adopted the strategy from the 
Alabama playbook.  The Minnesota legislature carved the Village of 
Duluth out of the City of Duluth, included within the village virtually 
all of the population and taxable property of the city, denied the city’s 
ability either to have access to taxes raised by the village or to create a 
means of allowing bondholders suits against the city, but permitted city 
bondholders to exchange their bonds for village bonds in an amount of 
one-fourth of the surrendered city bonds. 105   In an opinion that 
overruled the city and village’s demurrer to the complaint, the court 
concluded that the facts admitted by the defendants permitted 
creditors to follow the assets of the city into the village. 106   The 
legislature was entitled to create the village out of the territory of the 
city and to apportion the existing indebtedness between them; it was 
not entitled to extract population and taxable property in a manner 
that denied existing creditors of any reasonable capacity to obtain 
payment of the debt.107 
The obligations of a municipal corporation are not affected, although 
the name may be changed and the territory increased or diminished, 
if the new organization embraces substantially the same territory and 
the same inhabitants.  It may be true that generally creditors, to obtain 
relief, must look exclusively to the corporation creating the debt; but 
when a state of facts exists as disclosed here, and the old corporation 
is diminished in population, wealth, and territory to the extent 
admitted, it would be a mockery of justice to withhold the relief 
asked.108 
Not only did the court fail to invoke the language of the Contracts 
Clause, but also it explicitly deferred the issue of whether the statute 
impaired the obligation of contracts.  Instead, it relied on equitable 
principles to require the defendants at least to answer the plaintiff’s 
claim for recovery on his bonds.109 
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Other dissolution strategies to limit creditor recoveries left existing 
boundaries intact but reduced municipal revenue-raising capacity 
below what prior bondholders would have anticipated at the time they 
extended credit.  These cases provide precursors to contemporary 
cases of asset shifting.  Where municipal revenues are insufficient to 
pay both creditors and providers of current services, municipal 
residents presumably would prefer to have their tax payments 
dedicated to the latter since the benefits to be realized from the former 
have already been received.  If payments for current services have 
priority, municipal residents might wish to restrict municipalities’ 
capacity to generate revenues sufficient to pay debts.  States facilitated 
such strategies by withdrawing taxing power from indebted localities, 
perhaps leaving enough resources to fund essential services while 
denying payments to creditors.  The City of Quincy, Illinois, for 
example, received legislative approval to purchase railroad stock, pay 
for the purchase through bond issuance, and impose a special tax 
sufficient to pay interest on the bonds.110  Quincy failed to impose the 
special tax or to pay debt service. 111   But in refusing to pay 
bondholders, the city also relied on a tax limitation that the legislature 
enacted subsequent to issuance of the bonds.112  The city contended 
that tax revenues within that limit would be insufficient to pay both the 
expenses of the city and a judgment on the defaulted bonds.113  Here, 
too, the Supreme Court intervened to protect creditors by invalidating 
post-issuance state reductions of local assets — here, taxing capacity — 
to pay debts.  In Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, the Court concluded 
that the original statute that authorized issuance of the bonds and 
provided payment through the special tax constituted a contract with 
bondholders.114  Subsequent repeal of that taxing authority sufficiently 
impaired the obligation of that contract as to be “a nullity.”115 
One might have thought that the existence of the special tax in Von 
Hoffman would serve as a sufficient basis for distinguishing the case 
from Meriwether in evaluating state reductions of municipal assets.  
After all, Justice Field had drawn a distinction between special taxes 
and ordinary taxes when he found that creditors had no right to the 
latter in the Memphis case.116  But that was not the route the Court 
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adopted in Von Hoffman or thereafter.  Wolff v. City of New 
Orleans117 also involved the effects of a post-issuance tax limitation.  
New Orleans had issued railroad aid bonds but imposed no special tax 
to pay them. 118   After default, the city contended that it held no 
unappropriated funds that could be used for the bonds and that a 
statute limiting the amount of taxes that could be imposed prohibited 
taxation sufficient to pay the outstanding debt.119  As in Von Hoffman, 
the assumption in Wolff appears to have been that funds appropriated 
to provide essential municipal services took priority over bondholder 
claims.120  A strict reading of Meriwether might suggest that the court 
could impose no remedy because the legislature had defined the scope 
of taxation, and federal courts could not exceed it.  A strict reading of 
Von Hoffman might suggest that post-issuance, state-imposed 
constraints on taxation were not valid against bondholders who 
anticipated use of the taxing power to pay debt service.  But Justice 
Field chose not to choose among precedents.  Instead, he distinguished 
the cases.  For him, the decision in Meriwether was justified by the 
absence of any municipal incorporation that could impose the taxes 
necessary to pay bondholders: 
The city with all her officers having thus gone out of existence, there 
was no organization left — no machinery — upon which the courts 
could act by mandamus for the enforcement of her obligations to 
creditors.  The question considered, therefore, was whether the taxes 
levied before the repeal of the charter, but not paid, were assets which 
the court could collect through a receiver and apply upon judgments 
against the city.121 
The Louisiana legislature, however, had left the New Orleans 
government intact.  Hence, the Court could require the assessment and 
collection of taxes by the very officers who had created the obligations 
on which the bondholders had received a judgment.122  In an expansive 
reading of Von Hoffman that made the existence of a special tax 
irrelevant, Justice Field interpreted that case as broadly invalidating 
limits on the taxing power that the city had possessed when the 
contested bonds were issued.123 
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That seems like a little too much hair splitting.  Certainly, from the 
creditors’ perspective, whether the debtor municipality was merged 
into another municipality as in Town of Mt. Pleasant or the 
municipality retained its identity but had limited taxing authority as in 
Wolff, or municipal functions were placed under the jurisdiction of a 
different entity such as the state receiver in Meriwether, seems 
irrelevant to the availability of pledged taxes.124  Justice John Marshall 
Harlan perhaps agreed.  His concurrence with the majority opinion in 
Wolff made clear his dissatisfaction with Justice Field’s discussion of 
Meriwether: “Nor do I wish to be understood as assenting to the 
correctness of the statement in the opinion as to what was involved and 
decided in Meriwether v. Garrett.”125 
The Court’s broad reading of Von Hoffman in Wolff also appears 
problematic.  Read as a prohibition of post-issuance tax reductions 
without regard to the consequences for debt satisfaction, the holding in 
Wolff would bar virtually any municipal or state restructuring of city 
taxing arrangments in place at the time bonds were issued — 
reformation of property taxes to equalize spending among school 
districts, granting property tax relief to lower-income property owners, 
tax abatements to attract residents and tax base, etc. — because all such 
efforts arguably “render[] less efficacious” the means of enforcing 
bonds by reducing assets available to creditors.126  Such an absolutist 
view of the Contracts Clause may not survive post-Blaisdell 
jurisprudence.  But that does not mean that pre-Blaisdell cases are 
irrelevant.  Instead it requires a more careful distillation of what 
motivated the strong holdings in those cases to see whether similar 
circumstances characterize the more contemporary efforts to divert 
municipal assets.  Unless those circumstances are distinguishable, the 
similar effects of current municipal asset diversion may generate 
similar legal results, even if the test for state intervention has become 
less absolute.  I next turn to those issues. 
B. Holdouts or Holdups? Motive and Dissolution 
The doctrinal distinctions and inconsistencies in these cases suggest 
that something more complicated than variations on state strategies for 
withdrawing municipal assets from creditors’ reach was at stake.  
Perhaps the Court was attempting to work out an appropriate balance 
between creditor rights and the need to grant states some latitude in 
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allowing their localities to escape fiscal distress.  That balance could 
change over time or from case to case, depending, perhaps, on what the 
courts viewed as the underlying motivation for the legislative diversion 
of municipal assets.  Perhaps the Court was attempting to distinguish 
between cases in which solvent municipalities were exhibiting a 
reluctance to pay and cases in which payment was either impossible127 
or, given the fraudulent underpinnings of the contested debt, 
inequitable. 128   Perhaps the Court, after demonstrating initial 
compassion for municipalities that received nothing in return for 
incurring crushing obligations, ultimately decided that permitting 
states too much latitude to alter creditors’ bargains would restrict 
credit markets at a time when infrastructure finance depended on 
municipal access to capital.  Even in Meriwether, Justice Field decried 
repudiation of debts.  In suggesting that creditors could find a 
sympathetic voice in state legislatures that might yet authorize tax 
collections that federal judges could not, Justice Field reminded all 
listeners: 
It is certainly of the highest importance to the people of every State 
that it should make provision, not merely for the payment of its own 
indebtedness, but for the payment of the indebtedness of its different 
municipalities.  Hesitation to do this is weakness; refusal to do it is 
dishonor.  Infidelity to engagements causes loss of character to the 
individual; it entails reproach upon the State.129 
Others have similarly suggested that in the several hundred 
decisions concerning municipal bonds in the late nineteenth century, 
federal courts generally, and the Supreme Court in particular, were 
motivated largely by a desire to serve the interests of capital.130  That 
instrumental thesis may be less compelling than it appears from 
consideration of the consequences of the decisions, which certainly 
would have buoyed capital markets.  Allison Buccola and Vincent 
Buccola have recently demonstrated that the Supreme Court decisions 
were more law-bound than the pro-capital thesis can bear, and that 
courts frequently decided at least those cases involving the validity of 
the bonds in a manner that reflected optimal risk allocation rather than 
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blind subservience to the interests of capital.131  The validity cases, 
however, were not the only ones that involved the allocation of risk.  
The dissolution cases similarly addressed allocation of the risk that the 
project to be funded with bond proceeds — typically railroads — would 
prove as commercially rewarding as anticipated.132  Where that did not 
happen, either because the railroad did not get constructed at all or 
because it ultimately failed, debtor municipalities that sought to escape 
payments essentially argued that bondholders, not they, bore the risk 
of project failure.  Municipalities did not necessarily claim that they 
had no assets to pay bondholders; rather, as cases like Von Hoffman 
and Wolff indicate, it was common for municipalities to claim that 
municipal assets must first be used to maintain municipal services and 
that bondholders had to bear the risk of project failure if insufficient 
funds remained to pay debts. 133   State intervention that reduced 
municipal assets and thus contributed to the shortfall was simply 
consistent with the understood risk allocation.  For creditors, of course, 
that same intervention was simply strategic offloading of a risk that 
bondholders had paid to impose on the municipality. 
But a close reading of the dissolution cases reveals an alternative or 
different motivation that complicates the issue of whether states were 
benignly attempting to rescue distressed localities or malignly 
attempting to exploit investors.  The dissolving state legislation at stake 
in some of the cases recited that funds could be used to compromise 
debts and sometimes even to set the reservation price in any 
negotiation.  Recall, for example, the legislative requirement in the 
City of Mobile dissolution that required the city “to treat with the 
holders of the funded debt of the city of Mobile with a view to its 
adjustment and settlement.”134   Similarly, the Tennessee legislation 
challenged in Meriwether created a commission “to settle and 
compromise the indebtedness of said municipal corporation, by 
funding the same, at a rate not exceeding fifty-five cents in the dollar 
on judgments, and not exceeding fifty cents in the dollar for bonds or 
coupons past due.”135 
In effect, in an era without a federal municipal bankruptcy law, 
legislative proposals of a “final offer” may have been the functional 
equivalent of the current requirement that a municipality negotiate in 
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good faith with creditors as a prerequisite to entering Chapter 9.136  
What is less clear is whether these efforts at settlement were, in fact, 
motivated by good faith and by actual constraints on the debtor’s 
ability to pay, or whether they reflected a strategic desire to drive 
creditors to the bargaining table and to impose a settlement that 
required a lesser contribution from the debtor than might be required 
by a “good faith” standard.  As Albert Miller Hillhouse recounted, 
“[m]uch of the resistance and defensive litigation on the part of the 
debtor localities was designed solely to wear out the creditors and drive 
them eventually, in desperation, to a compromise favorable to the 
repudiators.” 137   Notwithstanding expressions of sympathy for 
residents faced with devastating financial burdens incurred for projects 
that never reached their potential, Monkkonen concluded, “taxpayers 
in the late nineteenth century tried to avoid paying their debts if they 
thought they could get away with it.”138 
These sentiments suggest a degree of creditor powerlessness that 
seems inconsistent with the traditional understanding of municipal 
creditors.  In the absence of federal bankruptcy proceedings to 
overcome the Contracts Clause’s constraints, the general problem for 
compromising municipal debts had historically been the presence of 
holdout creditors.139  Constitutional restrictions on the state’s ability to 
impair contracts meant that only consensual compositions of municipal 
indebtedness were permissible — a problem that Congress much later 
identified as the basis for ultimately enacting a federal municipal 
bankruptcy law.140   Until that time, the unanimity requirement for 
creditor consent to debt adjustment permitted a small number of 
holdouts to condemn any plan to rescue municipalities from debt 
overhang by reducing the amount of indebtedness.  The states’ 
withdrawal of previously available assets from creditors’ reach can be 
seen as a relatively benign response to the holdout threat.  But once 
armed with that capacity, states could use the withdrawal threat 
strategically, even against creditors who were not engaged in holdout 
tactics.  Since dissolution threatened to leave creditors with no 
recovery at all, their next best alternative was to accept any positive 
recovery promised by the state, even if the locality could have afforded 
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 137. HILLHOUSE, supra note 30, at 172. 
 138. MONKKONEN, supra note 12, at 69. 
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a greater payout than the state was offering.141  In effect, the state’s 
option to withdraw assets from the municipality’s sources for debt 
payments allowed it to transform the holdout game controlled by 
creditors to one of holdup controlled by the state.142  Under current 
bankruptcy law, such failure to make a substantial contribution to debt 
adjustment would likely preclude a municipality from satisfying the 
requirement of confirmation a proposed plan be “in the best interests 
of creditors.”143  For example, in Fano v. Newport Heights Irrigation 
District, the court rejected a plan of adjustment that did not impose 
tax-rate increases on district residents, given the absence of a showing 
that the district had inadequate taxing power.144  The court concluded 
that the failure to impose such increases illicitly placed the entire 
burden of adjustment on bondholders.145  The similar lengths to which 
the state was willing to play its advantage is evident in the Louisiana 
legislation that led to the decision in Wolff. 146   The Louisiana 
legislature did not simply impose a tax limitation that made payment 
of the bonds implausible, given the assumed priority of using taxes to 
pay the “necessary expenses of the city.” 147   It also provided an 
alternative for bondholders that the city contended created a sufficient 
substitute to avoid any claim of impairment.  Creditors could exchange 
their bonds for “premium bonds.”148  Notwithstanding the euphemism, 
the premium bonds bore no maturity date.149  Instead, those bonds 
were divided into 10,000 series of 100 bonds each, and the time of 
payment of each bond within a series was determined by an annual 
lottery drawing of the relevant series, followed by a drawing of bonds 
within that series to be paid in that year.150  As summarized by the 
Court in Wolff, 
under this arrangement, whether a creditor will be paid in one or in 
fifty years, will depend upon the turn of a wheel and the drawing of a 
lucky number.  Of course this plan disregards all the terms upon which 
the outstanding bonds of the city — and, among others, those held by 
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the relator — were issued, and postpones indefinitely the payment of 
both their principal and interest.151 
It was against this background that the Court concluded that, although 
the state legislature retained the discretion “at any time [to] restrict or 
revoke at its pleasure any of the powers of a municipal corporation, 
including, among others, that of taxation,”152  that power “must be 
exercised in subordination to the principle which secures the 
inviolability of contracts.”153  But, again, it is plausible that abstract 
notions of inviolability were less important to the decision than was 
judicial suspicion of state overreaching.  The Court did not engage in 
any rigorous analysis of what would have constituted a balanced 
allocation of losses between residents and creditors.  Nor did it believe 
it had to.  The Court’s ridicule of the state’s proposed procedure 
implied that — as in cases where cities had been dissolved — the state 
had instituted a mechanism that so drastically disfavored creditors 
relative to residents as to render its impropriety obvious.  A more 
balanced distribution of losses might have generated a different result. 
Whether the state was acting malignly or benignly in the dissolution 
cases was further complicated by the fact that not all residents within 
an indebted municipality had the same motives.  Hillhouse and 
Monkkonen suggested that small property owners and rural residents 
were prone to favor default, while those who had tied their fortunes to 
city growth wanted to preserve municipal credit and “favored debt 
payment when feasible and renegotiation when not.” 154   But the 
difficulty in discerning whether it was the state or the creditors who 
were acting strategically did not necessarily mean that the inquiry was 
irrelevant.  Benign, and thereby permissible, interventions may have 
been the appropriate conclusion where the court believed the state was 
attempting to maintain municipal functions and pay its “just liabilities” 
to the extent possible; a malign intervention constituting an invalid 
impairment may have been the appropriate conclusion where the court 
believed the state was attempting to hold up creditors in favor of a 
recalcitrant but not necessarily impoverished municipality. 
More explicit recognition that state intervention placing a 
disproportionate cost of adjustment on creditors would affect its 
legality would have to wait until the next period of municipal fiscal 
distress.  The turning point in the analysis occurred in the post-
 
 151. Id. at 364. 
 152. Id. at 365. 
 153. Id. at 366. 
 154. MONKKONEN, supra note 12, at 89. 
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Depression case of Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park155 
referenced at the beginning of this Article.  Faitoute was not a 
dissolution case nor one in which the state withdrew assets from the 
indebted municipality.  Instead, it involved a plan for the adjustment 
or composition of creditors’ claims under what was essentially a state 
bankruptcy act.156  But Justice Frankfurter’s opinion set forth some 
principles by which the propriety and validity of states stripping assets 
from municipalities can be evaluated.  The New Jersey act allowed a 
state commission, with the approval of the state supreme court, to 
adjust the debts of a distressed municipality with the approval of 
creditors representing 85% of the contested indebtedness if approval 
of the plan was preceded by findings, among other things, that the 
municipality could not afford both to pay the debt and to perform its 
public functions.157  The proposed plan extended the time for payment 
of outstanding bonds and reduced the interest rate in the interim but 
did not compromise the principal amount.  Justice Frankfurter seized 
on the independent nature of the inquiry into affordability and the 
absence of an alternative that would allow creditors a greater recovery 
to conclude that the state act did not operate as an impairment.158  
Indeed, he appeared to read a “changed circumstances” exception into 
the Contracts Clause, under which the intervention of extreme 
circumstances entitled the state to take action that would preserve 
municipal functions and taxation but also ensure ultimate payment of 
creditors.159  Perhaps most importantly, Justice Frankfurter concluded 
that the New Jersey scheme reached a balance that was not exploitative 
of creditors because the compromise passed a market test of 
impairment; bonds that were selling at 0.69 on the dollar at the time 
when the legislation was passed were trading at 0.90 on the dollar at 
the time of the Court’s decision.160 
Justice Frankfurter’s criteria for permitting state intervention has 
conflicting consequences for the dissolution cases.  Certainly, he was 
attentive to the holdout problem that, unaddressed, would leave 
distressed municipalities at the mercy of creditors, and that arguably 
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required some credible threat that failure to compromise would 
disadvantage creditors.161  But Justice Frankfurter’s analysis suggested 
that states would not be given free rein to hold up creditors.  Instead, 
some balance between state and creditor interests was the predicate for 
approving state intervention.  His emphasis on the independent 
evaluation of municipal capacity to pay, on the maintenance of the 
initial principal amount (notwithstanding the extension of time for 
payment), on the practicality of an alternative remedy, and on the need 
to consider the best interests of creditors seems directed at the holdup 
problem with which states confronted creditors in the nineteenth 
century.162  All those factors suggest that the dissolution cases that 
invalidated the withdrawal of municipal assets were a reaction to a 
perceived desire by the state and municipality to repudiate debts rather 
than to balance municipal fiscal need against creditor expectations.  In 
those cases, little in the allegedly impairing legislation provided 
assurances that debtor municipalities would pay what they could afford 
while simultaneously performing essential municipal functions. 
At the same time, Justice Frankfurter’s suggestion that market 
valuations at the time of litigation could determine the propriety of 
state intervention raises greater difficulty for the dissolution cases and 
for evaluating state withdrawal of assets generally.  The difficulty arises 
from the temporal gap between when the allegedly impairing 
legislation is litigated and when its effects are realized.  Bonds, of 
course, are issued for significant periods of time.  In Faitoute, the 
maturity of bonds that fell into default in payment of interest in 1935 
was extended to 1966.163  The original maturity date of the defaulted 
bonds is not clear from the report of the case, but, given the bonds were 
issued in 1929 and 1930,164 it is reasonable to assume that the original 
maturity dates were significantly earlier than the extended period.  As 
a result, bondholders who were initially willing to take the risk of 
municipal solvency for a limited period of time were required to take 
that risk for a longer period, and the fact that the plan of adjustment 
reduced the nominal interest rate on the new bonds indicates that 
creditors were not paid to take that longer-term risk.  A conclusion that 
the New Jersey legislation did not cause an impairment under those 
circumstances because market values of the outstanding bonds had not 
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declined makes assumptions about the relevant credit markets that are 
not easily sustained.  Even if the issuer’s financial condition in the 
period shortly after state intervention improved sufficiently to 
generate an increase in the bonds’ value at that time, there would be 
no reason to conclude that those favorable financial conditions would 
continue throughout the extended period during which the bonds 
would be outstanding.  Stripping municipal revenues once available to 
creditors may be superfluous at the time the withdrawal occurs because 
sufficient revenues from alternative sources remain available to pay all 
debt service.  But it is plausible that subsequent decline in the debtor’s 
financial position would mean that those same stripped assets become 
necessary to pay debt service prior to or at maturity.  Unless one 
believes that current market prices of municipal securities perfectly 
capitalize the risk of all future events, then neither changes nor stability 
in market prices will correctly gauge the effects of a current alteration 
of municipal revenue-raising capacity on a future ability to pay.  The 
likelihood of full capitalization in municipal bond markets seems 
remote, and even lower than in other securities markets, due to 
relatively thin trading in municipal bonds and relatively low-price 
transparency.165 
The concern that financial conditions could worsen subsequent to 
the withdrawal of assets may be less relevant to the dissolution cases, 
and perhaps even to Faitoute.  In those cases, default had already 
occurred, so it is difficult to imagine that the issuers’ financial 
conditions could worsen post-withdrawal.  In addition, in the 
dissolution cases, the withdrawn assets previously available to creditors 
were so substantial a part of what had previously been pledged to 
support the debt that there was little chance that remaining assets could 
satisfy creditors’ claims in full or were proportionate to the sacrifices 
being made by residents.166  In short, those were not cases in which 
there was simply a hypothetical differential between the sufficiency of 
the original assets and the post-intervention assets to satisfy 
bondholders or that residents had contributed in good faith to 
settlement.  Thus, the true test of whether a current withdrawal of 
assets might be improper because of effects in the distant future would 
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have to await situations in which current withdrawal of assets posed 
more conjectural adverse future effects. 
III. DIVERSION OF ASSETS TO NEW CREDITORS 
A. Asset Stripping Through Bankruptcy Remote Entities 
More recent efforts to withdraw assets from an indebted 
municipality raise the temporal issue more acutely.  In this Section, I 
discuss how states have engaged in asset stripping through a form that 
does not simply eliminate a source of revenues previously available to 
creditors as in the dissolution cases.  Rather, state intervention has 
taken the form of diverting assets previously available to satisfy one set 
of creditors and making those assets available exclusively to a different 
set of creditors.  In at least some of these cases, the objective of the 
diversion was to obtain a new capital infusion to the municipality.  Post-
issuance diversion of assets might initially have insignificant adverse 
effects on the municipality’s capacity to pay its debts.  But that same 
action could, during the period when the debt is outstanding, 
significantly reduce the security available to the first group of creditors. 
This contemporary form of asset stripping evolved from New York 
City’s fiscal crisis in the early to mid-1970s.  When the city faced fiscal 
paralysis, it was precluded from borrowing in the capital markets by a 
combination of balanced budget requirements, lack of access to capital 
markets, 167  and state constitutional requirements that permitted 
issuance of general obligation debt only if secured by the city’s faith 
and credit.168  While the state legislature was sympathetic to the city’s 
distress and recognized that the city’s bankruptcy would have ripple 
effects across the state,169 the legislature was not of a mind to dissolve 
the city or shift municipal boundaries in a manner that would 
dispossess creditors of the right to realize on taxes of the city.  But the 
legislature did the next best thing, perhaps the functional equivalent 
from the perspective of pre-existing creditors.  The state legislature 
created the Municipal Assistance Corporation for the City of New 
York (MAC) as an entity of New York State. 170   The state then 
removed from New York City the right to collect a sales tax and 
enacted an identical state tax, the proceeds of which were allocated to 
MAC, and redirected to MAC the proceeds of the previous New York 
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City tax on stock transfers (shades of the replacement of Memphis 
taxes with state taxes allocated to the new taxing district?).171  MAC 
then used those revenues to secure its own obligations, the proceeds of 
which were in turn allocated to New York City’s efforts to provide 
services.172  Importantly to bondholders, MAC was an entity of the 
state and the direct recipient of sales and stock transfer tax revenues.  
Those funds never passed through the city, as they had prior to the 
enacting legislation.  MAC, therefore, constituted a bankruptcy-
remote entity,173 the assets of which presumably could not be reached 
by city creditors if New York City itself petitioned for debt adjustment 
under federal bankruptcy law. 
The diversion of revenues from the city to MAC became a critical 
mechanism for solving the liquidity crisis that New York City faced 
when it was unable to access credit markets on its own.  Creditors were 
willing to lend to MAC funds that would ultimately end up in the city 
coffers because they felt secure that the pledged revenues were 
sufficient to pay MAC obligations and that creditors of the city would 
be unable to reach MAC’s assets even if the city entered bankruptcy. 
But the fact that those same revenue sources had previously been 
part of the city treasury meant that pre-existing city creditors would 
not have considered their availability to pay city debts superfluous.  At 
the time they purchased their bonds, those creditors had received a 
pledge of the city’s “faith and credit,” a term of ambiguous meaning 
but one that the New York Court of Appeals defined as “a 
commitment to pay and a commitment of the city’s revenue generating 
powers to produce the funds to pay.”174   One might have thought, 
therefore, that purchasers of bonds secured by such a pledge were 
relying on the capacity of the city to have continued access to the 
sources of revenue that it possessed at the time of purchase.  After all, 
tax limitation cases like Von Hoffman had been predicated on the 
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general principle that taxing authority in place at the time bonds were 
issued could not be diluted or eliminated while the bonds were 
outstanding.175  Bondholders might reasonably have concluded that 
stripping revenue sources from the city and reassigning them, thus 
making outstanding bonds less secure than they had previously been, 
was indistinguishable from, and no more legitimate under the 
Contracts Clause than, stripping the city’s revenue-generating 
authority by limiting its taxing capacity, or simply dissolving it or 
merging it into another municipality that claimed no obligation to 
satisfy the city’s bondholders. 
The diversion of municipal revenues initially thought available to 
existing creditors has been deployed elsewhere, either to assist a 
distressed municipality or simply to raise additional capital.  Perhaps 
most famously or notoriously, Puerto Rico officials created an 
authority, Corporación del Fondo de Interés Apremiante (COFINA), 
to receive sales tax revenues, presumably to issue bonds secured by 
those revenues, and thereby obtain capital at relatively low interest 
rates.176  That capital was then to be used to finance a deficit and reduce 
the Commonwealth’s significant debt burden.177  But the COFINA 
experience reveals the very risk that funds once relied on by existing 
creditors, then diverted elsewhere could become appropriate if not 
necessary to satisfy the former group’s claims.  Subsequent to the 
issuance of COFINA bonds, the Commonwealth’s deficit grew, not 
shrank, and general obligation bondholders who suffered default 
ultimately contended that they had both a claim to sales tax revenues 
and priority in those revenues over the COFINA bondholders. 178  
While that claim was rooted in arguments about the meaning of arcane 
terms in the Commonwealth Constitution, its underpinnings are again 
reminiscent of the claims in the nineteenth-century cases — general 
obligation bondholders have claims to revenue sources subsequently 
diverted to other purposes. 
More recently, Illinois has created bankruptcy-remote structures in 
an effort to assist the City of Chicago, which faces significant financial 
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challenges. 179   Initially, Chicago’s school district, which is legally 
separate from the city itself, was permitted to issue bonds financed 
through a capital improvement tax, a move that allowed the bonds to 
be rated well above the junk bond ratings that Chicago city’s own 
bonds attracted. 180   The state legislature subsequently permitted 
Chicago and other home rule municipalities to create nonprofit 
corporations and to assign them state-collected sales tax revenues that 
would otherwise have been dedicated to the city.181  Those nonprofit 
corporations may then issue debt, secured by the sales tax revenues.182  
Because the nonprofit corporation is likely to have lower borrowing 
costs than a distressed city like Chicago, it can use the sales tax 
revenues to pay debt service and have sufficient funds remaining to 
distribute back to the city.183  But the reallocation of sales tax revenues 
means that general obligation bondholders of Chicago retain access to 
fewer assets to satisfy their claims after the diversion than they did 
previously, and the precarious financial situation of the city suggests 
that that reduction is, again, not superfluous. 
If diversion risks the same adverse effects for creditors as dissolution 
strategies, then one might claim that the former strategy is no more 
appropriate than the more blatant forms of asset stripping one sees in 
the latter.  That was essentially the claim that a bondholder made in 
the wake of the reallocation of New York City taxes to MAC.  In Quirk 
v. Municipal Assistance Corp., 184  the New York Court of Appeals 
upheld the diversion to MAC of the revenues previously available to 
the city on the grounds that “[i]n no way was the city ever committed 
to maintain sales tax revenues or stock transfer tax revenues for the 
benefit of its bondholders.”185  Bondholders were instead protected by 
the state constitution’s faith and credit pledge, payable from local real 
estate taxes.  Bondholders — even those who were the recipients of the 
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city’s pledge of its faith and credit — had no “right to insist that any 
particular existing taxes be maintained or new ones imposed to 
produce those revenues” necessary to meet that pledge.186  Without 
citing Justice Field’s distinction in Meriwether, the court implicitly 
acknowledged his assertion that “ordinary taxes” that had not been 
explicitly dedicated to debt service on specific bonds were not 
necessarily available to satisfy a bondholder’s claim to municipal 
revenues. 
B. The Temporal Issue — Future Consequences of                         
Current Asset Stripping 
Notwithstanding its approval of the diversion strategy, the court’s 
opinion in Quirk was notable for two qualifying remarks.  First, the 
court concluded with the admonition that “[a] different case would be 
presented if, realistically, the city were stripped of all sources of 
revenue, other than the real estate tax.”187  In short, the court appeared 
to endorse the same kind of Lockean proviso evident in the nineteenth-
century Supreme Court decisions and more explicit in Faitoute — 
legislative manipulation of municipal resources was acceptable, as long 
as bondholders’ opportunity to receive payment was not diluted too 
much in light of the what was necessary to resolve municipal fiscal 
distress.  Of course, the temporal issue complicates the issue of how 
great that opportunity is or must be when a current withdrawal of assets 
could implicate the potential for default in years to come.  The court of 
appeals left that issue unaddressed.  Indeed, the court concluded that 
the outcome of a case in which all non-real estate revenues were 
diverted “would be, at this time, unpredictable.”188  But more than in 
Faitoute, where bonds were already in default, the need to determine 
the subsequent impact of a diversion on existing holders of long-term 
bonds complicates the analysis.  Whether or not a particular state 
intervention impairs an obligation must be decided when the allegedly 
offending legislation is enacted.  It cannot be the case that the diversion 
of revenues did not constitute an impairment when taxes were 
allocated to MAC in 1977 but would be unconstitutional if it turned out 
that the sales tax revenues were necessary to pay city creditors in full 
when city bonds matured in the distant future.  The decision that the 
legislation did not create an impairment when enacted essentially binds 
the future. 
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As I noted above, a market test will provide little assistance in 
determining the future, potentially impairing effects of current 
legislation.189  Diversion of sales taxes, for example, might not have 
adversely affected the value of New York City bonds at a time when 
the very creation of MAC signaled an unwillingness of the state to 
allow New York City to fail or for its bonds to go into default.  But 
predicting the effect of the loss of sales taxes during the entire period 
when previously issued New York City bonds would be outstanding is 
riddled with uncertainty, and resolving the impairment issue by looking 
only at immediate market effects at the time of litigation shifts to 
bondholders the risk that such revenues will be necessary to service the 
debt in the future. 
Second, the court of appeals recognized the similarity of New York’s 
plan to the discredited efforts by states to remove the property and 
taxes of indebted municipalities from the reach of creditors.  The 
court’s citation for its assertion about the consequences of the 
“different case” in which the city lacked all other revenue sources was 
none other than the Supreme Court’s decision in the Port of Mobile 
case.190  In each situation, creditors who relied on assets available to 
the municipality at the time that credit was extended were 
disappointed to discover that those assets had been assigned to a third 
party.191  Thus, even in upholding a diversion strategy, the court was 
unwilling to distinguish its situation entirely from dissolution cases. 
Approval of the diversion strategy in Quirk may have been 
underwritten by the state’s interesting, if unique, constitutional 
requirement that general obligation bonds must be paid, even if limits 
on real estate taxes must be exceeded.192  The court of appeals had 
previously relied on that provision to invalidate the state’s attempt to 
impose a moratorium on New York City’s note payments.193   That 
mandate could be interpreted as rendering any additional security for 
bondholders superfluous and thus rendering the diversion of other 
taxes irrelevant.  But that is not what the court said, and the use of 
diversion by jurisdictions not bound by such security provisions 
suggests that a general defense of the strategy requires a broader 
justification.194 
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One could find some justification in analogous changes in municipal 
financial structures that have not generated constitutional difficulties.  
Indeed, subtle forms of municipal asset stripping that reduced revenues 
available to pre-existing creditors have been a standard financing 
procedure for municipalities for decades, as states and municipalities 
issued revenue bonds in an effort to evade state constitutional debt 
limits.195  Those limits typically apply to general obligation bonds, that 
is, bonds that are secured by the general revenues of the issuer.196  
Debts secured by a “special fund,” on the other hand, have 
traditionally fallen outside the scope of constitutional debt subject to 
debt limitations. 197   Initially, special funds comprised revenues 
generated by operation of the project constructed with bond proceeds, 
such as tolls from a financed toll bridge or parking revenues from a 
financed parking structure. 198   Excluding funds generated by the 
financed project from the category of constitutional debt made sense 
insofar as those revenues would not have existed but for the project 
financed with debt.199  They did not place the municipal treasury at risk 
because bondholders could only look to the revenues generated by 
operation of the facility financed with bond proceeds for repayment.200  
If the financed project failed, it was the bondholders, not residents of 
the issuer, that bore the loss since bondholders could not look to non-
project revenues to cover any shortfall.201  Courts that require some 
“nexus” between the project financed with bond proceeds and the 
revenue sources dedicated to debt service may be more focused on 
preventing an expansion of municipal indebtedness in a manner that 
eviscerates constitutional debt limits, but implicitly the adoption of the 
narrow special fund theory also ensures that holders of general 
obligation bonds have access to a broader array of municipal 
revenues.202 
Notwithstanding the justifications for excluding special fund or 
revenue debt from debt limitations, for several decades, multiple 
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jurisdictions have adopted a broad interpretation of the special fund 
doctrine that excluded from debt limits any obligations that were 
supported by a specific revenue stream of the issuer, even though those 
revenues bore no relationship to the project funded with bond 
proceeds.203  Parking meter revenues, for example, might have been 
available to pay holders of general obligation bonds, but might then be 
diverted to pay bonds of a convention center authority, even if the 
parking meters were located at a distance from the convention center.  
That interpretation prevailed even though the pledged revenues may 
otherwise have been available to pay pre-existing general obligation 
bondholders.  Courts have justified the expansion of the doctrine on 
various grounds, but largely on the theory that debt limitations apply 
to obligations secured by ad valorem property taxes.204 
Although the broad special fund doctrine has been attacked as a 
subterfuge on state constitutional debt limits,205 I am not aware of any 
successful claim that, by removing a source of revenue that may 
otherwise have been available to holders of general obligation bonds 
issued prior to the diversion of revenues to revenue bonds, the doctrine 
also violates the Contracts Clause.  At most, courts have expressed 
concern that balkanization of different revenue sources would 
effectively undermine any constraint on municipal borrowing.206  But 
that balkanization tends to occur when municipalities that require a 
means of evading a debt limitation remain in relatively good fiscal 
health, as evidenced by the fact that they have access to the credit 
markets.  The broad special fund doctrine effectively allows localities 
to expand their debt-incurring capacity to take advantage of that access 
or avoid an electoral vote that would be triggered if general obligation 
bonds, and the accompanying property taxes, were used to finance the 
same project.  The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld an extreme 
version of the concept when it permitted bonds to finance construction 
and repair public buildings to be secured by a tax levy on all taxable 
property in the state in an amount sufficient to pay debt service, but 
excluded those bonds from the constitutional debt limit on the grounds 
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that — although the bonds were secured by the type of ad valorem 
property taxes associated with general obligations that are the 
hallmark of “constitutional” debt — the legislative carve out essentially 
created a special fund that was sufficiently analogous to a revenue 
bond.207 
Widespread adoption of the special fund doctrine suggests that it 
would not be vulnerable to invalidation under the Contracts Clause, 
even if it were reconceptualized as a means of asset stripping rather 
than a mechanism for circumventing debt limits.  The absence of any 
such challenge to the practice notwithstanding the enlargement of the 
special fund doctrines suggests that bondholders do not consider 
themselves protected against such a strategy.  Courts that have 
committed to the doctrine may be motivated by a sense that debt limits 
themselves are either arbitrary or antiquated.208  Failure to validate 
even radical strategies for their circumvention could prevent 
municipalities from financing essential infrastructure.  It is implausible 
that courts would disrupt municipal credit markets at this stage by 
finding that debts supported by revenues with an insufficient nexus to 
the financed project impaired the obligations of general obligation 
bondholders.  But to the extent that acceptance of the broad special 
fund doctrine is predicated on the necessity for municipalities to access 
credit markets, it may have similar implications when asset stripping 
takes other forms or similarly serves municipal necessity, even at the 
risk of diluting the security of pre-existing creditors. 
One might then return to Justice Frankfurter’s use of a market test209 
to define the permissible scope of asset stripping.  If market prices of 
existing municipal securities remain stable after the issuer adopts a 
diversion strategy or issues additional bonds secured by a special fund, 
one might claim that serves as relatively conclusive evidence that the 
diversion failed to impair the pre-existing obligation.  Nevertheless, 
courts have not made significant use of the market test.  The court in 
Quirk, for example, made no inquiry into the effect of the reallocation 
of sales tax and stock transfer tax revenues on city bonds.210  The most 
significant post-Faitoute use of the market test appears in United 
States Trust Co. v. New Jersey 211  and its controversial application 
there.  The Court held that the repeal of a statutory covenant that the 
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey would not subsidize mass 
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transit facilities constituted an unconstitutional impairment. 212   As 
evidence of an impairment, bondholders contended that the post-
repeal market for the bonds had become thin, while the issuer 
maintained that the market had recovered and the bonds retained their 
“A” rating.213  The majority concluded that evidence concerning the 
market effects of the repeal was too ambiguous to assist in the 
determination of an impairment.214   Justice Harry Blackmun found 
additional ambiguity in the possibility that non-repeal factors could 
have affected market value, while other conditions, notably the very 
litigation about the repeal’s validity, might mean that not all relevant 
effects had yet been factored into market prices.215  Justice William J. 
Brennan’s dissent in United States Trust Co. observed that the 
ambiguity over market effects revealed an inability of bondholders to 
prove an adverse effect of the repeal and reiterated that any market 
effect had involved only a short-term reduction in value.216 
Neither side in the United States Trust Co. debate, however, 
addressed the temporal issue that I have suggested is inherent in 
assessing potential impairments.  Justice Blackmun’s observation that 
not all effects may be reflected in market prices at the time of litigation 
must be correct, but not only for the reasons that he suggested, that is, 
the litigation’s own effect on market value.217  Rather, the primary 
problem with using the market test to evaluate a current modification 
of the issuer’s revenue-raising capacity lies in the possibility of an event 
that dramatically increases default risk but is sufficiently remote at the 
time of litigation as not to be factored into current market prices.  That 
is not to say that the potential for such a risk means that any 
modification of revenue raising capacity creates an unconstitutional 
impairment.  That conclusion would return us to the pre-Depression 
case law that read the Contracts Clause as an absolute and would 
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preclude adjustments to outstanding obligations when they are most 
needed.218  But it does suggest that the market test is somewhat of a 
one-way ratchet for purposes of the impairment test.  If the state’s 
diversion of municipal revenues does cause an immediate and 
substantial decline in the affected bonds’ market value, an impairment 
seems obvious.  On the other hand, the absence of a market value 
decline at the time of the state’s intervention does not necessarily 
indicate the absence of an impairment since future events, 
unanticipated at the time of the litigation or otherwise not fully 
capitalized into current market prices, may reveal that the reduced 
security was necessary to make bondholders whole after all. 
Perhaps the decision that came closest to wrestling with the temporal 
issue was the opinion of the California Supreme Court when it 
evaluated the effects of California’s sweeping restrictions on property 
taxation.219  The initiative that promulgated those restrictions excluded 
from the new tax limitation any indebtedness previously approved by 
the voters.220   That exclusion appears to have been a bow towards 
nineteenth-century Supreme Court cases such as Von Hoffman.  But 
the exclusion did not apply to bonds that had been issued without the 
requirement of a bond election, such as redevelopment bonds secured 
by anticipated property tax increments attributable to 
redevelopment.221  The California Supreme Court acknowledged that 
the new restrictions would reduce those tax increments to the 
detriment of bondholders.222  Nevertheless, the court concluded that 
no impairment of the bondholders was implicated.223  The court relied 
on the peculiar reasoning that nothing in the new law “requires local 
agencies to default either in meeting their preexisting contracts or in 
liquidating their outstanding bonds,” and that no default had yet 
occurred. 224   Of course, the Contracts Clause prohibition on the 
“impairment” of the obligation of contract assumes that current 
alterations of the initial bond contract may have future consequences 
rather than cause immediate default.  Nonpayment of an obligation 
may constitute a breach of the underlying contract, but it does not 
constitute an impairment.  Rather, an impairment arises when the state 
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takes an action today that reduces the likelihood that the obligor will 
be able to perform in the future in a manner consistent with the parties’ 
original understanding.225   Thus, the court’s contention, that in the 
absence of default any claim of a constitutional violation was 
premature, 226  seems inconsistent with underlying Contracts Clause 
principles. 
As a more plausible response to the claim of impairment, the court 
observed that the state created a fund to provide loan funds to local 
agencies at risk of defaulting on bonds, though it remained unclear, 
even to the court, how such loans would be structured or repaid.227  If 
the court was concluding that the substitution of one form of security 
for another would be sufficient to ward off an impairment, it relied on 
established principles, but only if the new security was the equivalent 
of the old.228  Certainly, the court’s ultimate determination that default 
was not an “[i]nevitable consequence” of the tax limitation sets an 
idiosyncratically high bar for an impairment.229 
But for purposes of the temporal issue, the California court’s more 
interesting analysis involved its recognition that withdrawal of assets 
today may have implications for creditors only in the distant future.230  
Those who claimed an impairment alleged that the new tax limits 
created an immediate “depreciation” of the security relied upon by the 
obligees.231  The court did not deny that such an effect had occurred.  
Rather, it concluded that Contracts Clause jurisprudence permitted 
post-obligation modification of statutes affecting creditors as long as 
those changes did not affect an express term of the agreement or have 
a substantial effect on the repayment of debts.232  In short, the court 
maintained, existing case law did not provide “that an unlawful 
impairment occurs immediately upon imposition of the tax restriction, 
without regard to its ultimate effect upon the repayment of preexisting 
debts.”233  But, again, therein lies the difficulty.  When dealing with 
obligations that may be outstanding for several decades after the state 
intervention, one cannot easily forecast the “ultimate effect” on the 
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ability to pay creditors.  For example, holders of Puerto Rico’s general 
obligation bonds did not challenge the diversion of sales taxes to secure 
COFINA bonds when the enabling legislation was enacted in 2006, but 
those same bondholders strenuously objected when it developed a 
decade later that the Commonwealth had insufficient funds to pay its 
full indebtedness.234  The consequence is that current market values 
are at best a rough proxy that assume the risk of future events is fully 
capitalized.  Perhaps for that reason, other courts have simply ignored 
the temporal issue.235 
That leaves us, however, with the following puzzle: if the diversion 
strategy has potential consequences for creditors similar to those that 
generated dissolution, then can the legal implications of the diversion 
cases be distinguished from those of the dissolution cases?  Aurelia 
Chaudhury, Adam J. Levitin, and David Schleicher suggested that at 
least some of the nineteenth-century dissolution cases are of limited 
precedential value, in part because their reasonings are opaque.236  But 
the cases may be sufficiently similar in their effects on creditors that it 
would be undesirable to declare the earlier ones inapplicable, and 
sufficiently distinguishable that they teach us some useful lessons about 
municipal finance.  They are certainly similar insofar as they reveal the 
utility of an asset stripping strategy by a state intent on assisting its 
financially imperiled municipalities from the reach of creditors.  
Removing the City of Mobile’s revenue-raising capacity was no less of 
an effort to assist its residents than shifting the New York City sales tax 
from city creditors to MAC creditors. 
There is, of course, a difference in the immediacy of the impact on 
creditors.  In the dissolution cases, default had already occurred or was 
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imminent, so there was no doubt that withdrawing assets would 
interfere with creditors’ ability to satisfy judgments obtained against 
issuers.237  In the diversion cases, actual losses would only occur in the 
future and might be purely hypothetical throughout the period when 
affected bonds remained outstanding.238  The court in Quirk implied 
that diversion of taxes did not necessarily entail default.239   It was 
plausible that alternative revenue sources, especially the 
constitutionally required tax on real estate, would be sufficient to pay 
debts. 240   That apparent difference dissipates somewhat when one 
recognizes the difficulty of forecasting the long-term effects of current 
changes in bondholder security.  Still, there is a matter of degree in the 
temporal effects of the alleged impairment, and in legal doctrines, 
matters of degree may matter.241 
Nevertheless, I am tempted to conclude that the most important 
distinction between the cases lies in the motive for adopting the 
dissolution or diversion strategy, largely as revealed by the state’s 
demand that the debtor minimize the loss to creditors.  Again, some 
kind of balancing or, in modern bankruptcy terms, “good faith” 
negotiation seems necessary before judicial validation of the asset 
stripping strategy.  Recall that one way to explain the dissolution cases 
is to view them as a reaction to states that had been insufficiently 
attentive to creditors’ interests and overly protective of debtor 
municipalities.242  Return, for example, to Monkkonen’s claim that the 
widespread defaults of the nineteenth-century railroad bond era often 
reflected political resistance to payment of debts rather than fiscal 
incapacity, or that residents were motivated by a failure to receive the 
benefits for which they thought they, or their officials, had 
bargained.243  The dissolution cases perhaps reveal an unwillingness by 
courts, at least federal courts, to deny residents an escape route when 
bonds were validly issued but default was triggered by regret due to the 
failure of the financed project.  Even if these debts were legally valid, 
that is, they had been issued for a permissible purpose and the issuer 
had jumped through the necessary prerequisites to issuance, the fact 
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remained that residents felt both overly burdened and duped. 244  
Monkkonen suggested that when railroads actually operated, the 
residents did not default, notwithstanding plausible arguments that the 
underlying debts had been illegally incurred. 245   The negative 
implication for Monkkonen is that debt repudiation was politically 
motivated and was used to shift risks of debts that had been validly, if 
imprudently, incurred from residents to bondholders.  Fairman’s rich 
history of the period suggests a similar battle in which nonpayment was 
underscored by political resistance even to compromise with 
bondholders that might have required the debtor to bear some of the 
risk of project failure.246 
The motivation behind MAC’s creation and diversion of New York 
City revenues to MAC bonds appeared quite different.  The New York 
legislature, and more recently Illinois, were creating new entities, albeit 
bankruptcy-remote ones, to obtain additional capital for a municipality 
otherwise unable to access credit markets.247  Rather than dissolve the 
city, the New York legislature was arguably diverting revenue to 
ensure the city’s survival by addressing a liquidity crisis.  In the 
dissolution cases, in short, the primary objective was to reduce creditor 
security or to hold up creditors in an effort to avoid improvidently 
incurred obligations.248  In the contemporary diversion cases, reducing 
creditor security was a necessary but secondary by-product of an effort 
to create a new set of creditors willing to invest capital if they could 
rely on specific security other than the city’s general credit.249  In this 
sense, the diversion strategy is akin to the special fund cases, in which 
new capital essential to municipal economic development can only be 
obtained by circumventing debt limitations.  Courts faced with 
governments in fiscal distress or constraints on growth have similarly 
winked at constitutional requirements by concluding that the use of 
intermediaries such as MAC did not undermine obligations for debtors 
to borrow only on a general obligation basis,250 or that the inclusion of 
a clause allowing the legislature to refuse to appropriate funds for debt 
service removed an obligation from the category of debt.251 
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Indeed, the stated objective in New York was to stave off default 
and bankruptcy that, if plausible, would likely have required 
bondholders to settle for significantly less than the face value of their 
bonds.252  As in Faitoute, the practical implications of the strategy may 
be different from the apparent efforts in the dissolution cases to 
repudiate debts fully or to force a settlement on bondholders who may 
have believed that they had already paid to offload the risk of project 
failure that had materialized. 
Of course, dissolution strategies similarly improve the municipal 
balance sheet by offloading debt.  There is an economic equivalence 
between a distressed municipality that is able to save a dollar of debt 
service by denying creditors access to that dollar and a municipality 
that is able to attract an additional dollar of revenue by securitizing 
revenues diverted from what was previously available to creditors.  In 
either case, the distressed municipality has a dollar more than it 
previously did and has the potential to reduce debt overhang.  But if 
we are concerned with ensuring that distressed localities are able to 
fund the services for which they were created and attract additional 
investment — rather than to pay for previously incurred debts, which 
is likely to deter investment — there may be a distinction between the 
two strategies.253  The diversion strategy is adopted for the very specific 
purpose of receiving capital infusions that can be used to provide 
services rather than to pay legacy costs and thus allow the municipality 
to regain its financial footing.  Diversion of prior city revenues in cases 
like MAC thereby addressed a liquidity crisis through a strategy which, 
if successful, would plausibly increase the probability of recoveries for 
existing creditors.  Nothing in the dissolution cases suggests that local 
savings from debt reduction would be used to attract new capital, and 
certainly they reveal no expectation that dissolution would make 
creditors better off.  Indeed, the repudiation of debt suggests both that 
the municipalities themselves had adopted an anti-debt position254 and 
that, even if they had not, repudiation would make future creditors 
wary of extending credit to them.  Repudiation may have been 
appropriate to avoid an existential threat to the defaulting 
municipalities.  But there was no hint, as there has been in the diversion 
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cases, that state intervention was part of an overall strategy to foster 
municipal economic growth and thus ensure delivery of the local public 
goods and services that the municipality was created to provide. 
CONCLUSION 
States that seek to resolve fiscal distress within their political 
subdivisions face both political and economic pressures to balance 
residents’ and creditors’ interests.  History reveals that those pressures 
may lead the state to engage in strategies that significantly favor one 
set of interests over the other.  Constitutional constraints, and the 
Contracts Clause in particular, create a bulwark against favoritism that 
significantly exploits creditors.  But the scope of those constraints must 
be attentive to the reasons why a state has selected one strategy for 
dealing with municipal fiscal distress over another.  Strategies that 
deprive creditors of access to assets previously thought pledged but 
that provide distressed cities with needed capital receive more 
deference than strategies that allow debtors to avoid the consequences 
of a default that has already occurred.  The former suggests a concerted 
effort to avoid debt overhang and ensure the economic development 
necessary for a city to finance the services it was created to provide.  
The latter does not.  Strategies that entail significant debtor 
contributions to relieving fiscal distress receive more deference than 
strategies that impose a holdup “compromise” on creditors.  The 
former suggests a desire to balance the interests of both residents and 
creditors.  The latter does not.  Courts may have difficulty 
distinguishing among these situations.  In particular, they will 
inevitably have difficulty predicting the long-term consequences of 
current efforts to divert revenues from the grasp of creditors.  At the 
very least, however, history suggests that judicial reactions to state-
approved asset stripping strategies that plausibly have similar effects 
on creditors depend on the court’s conception of what the state was 
attempting to accomplish more than on a desire to achieve doctrinal 
consistency. 
 
